"Overlapping Tax Revenue, Soft Budget, and Rent Seeking" by Toshihiro Ihori
CIRJE Discussion Papers can be downloaded without charge from:
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp.html
Discussion Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. They are not intended for
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author. For that reason Discussion Papers may
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author.
CIRJE-F-750
Overlapping Tax Revenue, Soft Budget, and Rent Seeking
Toshihiro Ihori
University of Tokyo








  This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from 
the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical 
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financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments’ 
rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is 
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soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment. 
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1. Introduction 
  This paper investigates how intergovernmental financing may stimulate 
both insufficient local public expenditures and inefficient rent seeking by 
highlighting the soft-budget constraint of grants from the central (or federal) 
government to subnational governments (hereafter, local governments) with 
overlapping tax bases. This paper theoretically analyzes the welfare implications of 
the soft-budget constraint of intergovernmental financing by developing a simple 
game between two governments. By incorporating both the vertical externality of 
public investment and the rent-seeking activities of local politicians or governments, 
we explore both positive and negative welfare effects of soft-budget outcomes with 
ex post grants from the central government. 
  The soft-budget constraint means that the local government (LG) may, 
after making a decision, receive an additional grant from the central government 
(CG), while the hard-budget constraint means the LG may not receive such a grant. 
It is well recognized that if local governments face soft-budget constraints, they will 
have an incentive to overspend, overborrow, and/or pay insufficient attention to the 
quality of investments that their borrowing finances. Such welfare-deteriorating 
overspending/overborrowing can occur through a common pool mechanism. See, for 
example, Wildasin (1997, 2004), Goodspeed (2002), Akai and Sato (2005), and 
Boadway and Tremblay (2005), among others. That is, the standard result is that if 
the CG imposes soft-budget constraints, inefficiently high levels of investment will 
occur. On the other hand, Besfamille and Lockwood (2004) show that hard-budget 
constraints can be too hard and discourage socially efficient investment. They point 
out the possibility that the hard-budget constraint would create an incentive to 
penalize investment too much for project failure, ultimately leading to the 
possibility that socially efficient projects may not be undertaken. Thus, the welfare 
implications of the soft-budget constraint seem ambiguous, and depend on their 
effects on public investment. In other words, the conventional thinking is that a soft 
budget is welfare deteriorating if public investment is too high. 
  We pay attention to the vertical externality of shared tax bases of the 
central and local governments in a real economy. Multilevel government normally 
means some commonality of tax base between the central and local governments. As 
a result the tax base may overlap, and shared tax bases may create the common 
pool problem1. In this paper, we do not consider such vertical/horizontal tax 
competition between the central and multi-local governments, but simply assume 
that tax rates are exogenously given for both the central and multi-local 
governments. Instead, we would like to focus on another externality of local 
expenditures due to the overlapping tax bases. 
When the tax share is exogenously given, useful local public investment 
may have a positive externality effect. That is, if an increase in local expenditure on   3
infrastructure stimulates macroeconomic activities, this response may enlarge the 
overlapping tax base, which would then increase taxes for the central government 
at the given shares of the tax base of the two governments. This creates a positive 
spillover of the vertical externality. The non cooperative Nash equilibrium level of 
local public investment in the hard-budget game may well be too low. Thus, the 
soft-budget game could be welfare improving if it stimulates insufficient public 
investment. 
In this paper, however, we also incorporate the rent-seeking activities of 
local politicians who are trying to obtain as much revenue for themselves subject to 
a utility constraint. We consider wasteful spending by the local government. In the 
tradition of the “Leviathan” models of government (see Brennan and Buchanan 
[1980] among others), wasteful projects are too high because of subsidies from the 
central government due to local governments’ political demands. Local politicians 
prefer “wasteful” public spending, which provides them with rent-seeking 
opportunities. In reality, this feature is very relevant. Some of the local 
expenditures are wasteful and associated with rent-seeking activities. 
We assume that government officials are trying to obtain as much revenue 
for themselves subject to a utility constraint. Suppose there are many types of 
politicians. The type of politician may be expressed as the degree of rent seeking. 
Voters may choose a type of politician by undertaking political efforts. If they spend 
more on political efforts, they may find or select a less rent-seeking politician. For 
simplicity, we assume that the optimizing behavior of voters is exogenously given in 
the model, so that both their political efforts and the resulting reservation utility 
are fixed. The opportunity of receiving an additional grant in the soft-budget game 
would stimulate wasteful rent-seeking activities, and hence reduce social welfare. 
We shall show that although the soft-budget game leads to the first-best level of 
public investment, it deteriorates equilibrium welfare by stimulating rent-seeking 
activities. 
In the standard-type model, the soft-budget outcome normally arises from 
information asymmetry or cost sharing. On the contrary, we consider a very simple 
two-period model without uncertainty or information asymmetry2. When the 
hard-budget game is over, the rent seeking is also over. Then, the benevolent 
central government may have an incentive to stimulate useful local expenditures in 
period 2 by means of additional grants ex post. Such additional grants could 
produce the soft-budget problem. If local governments anticipate this, the 
soft-budget outcome is caused by two channels: public investment and rent seeking. 
First of all, the soft-budget constraint would stimulate insufficient local public 
investment, which is beneficial. Second, it would also stimulate rent-seeking 
activities, which is not beneficial. We show that so long as the survival constraint on 
local governments is effectively fixed, the second deteriorating effect is more   4
powerful than the first beneficial effect, even if the beneficial effect helps in 
attaining the first-best level of public investment. We may conclude as follows. 
Since the utility from local public goods is fixed by the survival constraint of local 
politicians, an increase in public investment would not directly raise social welfare 
but will increase rent. Hence, the second deteriorating effect becomes more powerful 
than the first beneficial effect. 
This paper consists of six sections. In section 2, we develop a theoretical 
model of the central and local governments, and then consider the outcome of the 
first best as the reference point. In section 3, we investigate the hard-budget game 
between the benevolent central government and the rent-seeking local government. 
In section 4, we consider the soft-budget game and compare these two games. In 
section 5, we present some remarks. Finally, we conclude the paper with section 6. 
 
 
2. Analytical Model of Central and Local Governments 
2.1 Analytical Framework 
  We develop a two-period intergovernmental financing model of the two 
governments, the central government, and the lower-level local government, in a 
small open economy in order to explore how local public investment and wasteful 
spending may be stimulated under the soft-budget constraint. For simplicity, we 
consider a representative LG, and do not examine the free-riding and/or spillover 
effects within multi-local governments. Several studies have explored the horizontal 
and vertical externalities due to non-cooperative competition among multi-local 
governments (see Wilson [1999] among others). However, in reality, many LGs do 
cooperate. Furthermore, our model is a good approximation to Japan, where most 
LGs cooperate with the central government; their behavior may be suggestive of our 
model local government3. 
The central government would not like to commit itself to the initial 
decision of making no grants to the local government when the hard-budget game is 
over and period 2 starts. One contribution of this paper is to show that the 
soft-budget outcome could occur with a representative LG even if the central 
government intends to attain an optimal allocation of central and local public goods. 
This is a new result since the conventional literature on soft budgets normally 
assumes multi-local governments where the CG intends to transfer public goods to 
local governments in order to attain an optimal allocation of local public goods. 
Moreover, in this paper the soft-budget outcome may occur even if we assume away 
information asymmetry or cost sharing. Another important contribution is that the 
soft budget is shown to be welfare deteriorating even if the soft-budget game may 
attain the first-best level of public investment. In our framework, the inclusion of 
rent seeking is crucial to obtain the analytical result.   5
The representative LG provides useful local public goods g t and the CG 
provides useful nationwide public goods Gt in each period. Each public good is 
beneficial, and its utility is given by a twice-continuously differentiable and strictly 
quasi-concave function. Moreover, we assume that all goods are normal ones. The 
relative price of each good is set to unity for simplicity. Thus, social welfare W, 
which reflects the representative agent’s preferences over public goods, is given by 
  W =  12 2 () { () () } vg uG vg δ + +       (1) 
where 0 < δ < 1 is a discount factor. For simplicity, we do not explicitly consider the 
first-period spending by the CG,  1 G , in the social welfare function since it is 
exogenously fixed. Private consumption is also assumed to be fixed, and hence we 
only consider utility from public goods. This formulation may be justified because 
we assume that the tax rate on income is fixed and labor supply is exogenously 
given, so that the private optimizing behavior is not incorporated. If we explicitly 
consider private consumption for social welfare, the analytical results would be 
almost the same, qualitatively. See section 5.3. 
  The local government undertakes public investment k in period 1, which 
has the productive effect of raising tax revenue in period 2. Let Yt represent the total 
tax revenue of the two governments in period t (t = 1, 2). We assume that Y1 is 
exogenously given but Y2 increases as a result of public works implemented by the 
LG in period 1,  k .  ) ( 1 2 k f Y Y + = . The investment product function f( ) satisfies the 
standard Inada condition f’( ) > 0, f”( ) < 0. For simplicity, we do not consider public 
investment by the central government. In a multi-local government setting, local 
public investment may have spillover effects across regions. However, since we 
consider a representative local government, we do not incorporate such horizontal 
spillovers. See section 5.2. 
  Both central and local governments levy taxes on overlapping economic 
activities in period 2. The tax revenue is shared by the two governments. We set β 
as the LG’s portion of the total tax revenue, 0 < β < 1. Thus, the share of the central 
government in the total tax revenue is 1 – β. The share parameter β is assumed to 
be exogenously given. Public investment has a vertical externality effect on the CG’s 
tax revenue. 
  We consider pork barrel spending by the local government. As shown in Del 
Rossi and Inman (1999), wasteful pork barrel projects could be too high due to 
subsidies from the central government in response to local governments’ political 
demands. In the tradition of the Leviathan models of government (see Brennan and 
Buchanan [1980] among others), local politicians prefer “wasteful” public spending 
(S1, S2), which provides them with rent-seeking opportunities but does not benefit 
voters or consumers. In this sense, useful local spending is divided among  12 , gg , 
and  k , and wasteful local spending is divided between  1 S  and  2 S . In a real   6
economy, some of the public works are wasteful. Such wasteful public investment 
corresponds to  i S , and not k, in this model. In section 5.1, we discuss how the 
analytical result would be altered if the LG is benevolent. 
Next, we specify each government’s budget constraint. The budget 
constraints of the CG are given as follows: 
11 1 (1 ) GAB Y β += + −        (2-1) 
  22 2 (1 ) (1 ) Gr B Y A β ++ =− −       (2-2) 
where  i A   is a lump sum subsidy to the LG in period i = 1, 2 ( 0 i A ≥ ), B is CG debt, 
and  r > 0 is the exogenously given world interest rate. Note that in period 1 
11 (1 ) GY β =−  is exogenously given, and hence we do not explicitly consider  1 G  or 
1 (1 )Y β −   in the analytical framework. In the hard-budget game, the CG may choose 
1 A . At the same time, the CG commits itself to the initial value  2 0 A = . In this 
game the CG is the leader, while the LG is the follower. If the CG changes the value 
of  2 A  in period 2 when the hard-budget game is over, we call this state the 
soft-budget game. In this game, the LG becomes the leader, while the CG is the 
follower. 
  The period-by-period budget constraints of the LG are given as follows: 
  11 1 1 DgkYSA β =+ − + +       (3-1) 
  22 2 2 (1 ) gS r D YA β ++ + = +      (3-2) 
where  D is the LG debt, which is controlled by the CG. Alternatively, we may 
simply assume that the LG cannot issue any local debt: D = 0. 
From (3-1) and (3-2) we can write the objective function of the local 
government as follows: 
 
22 2 2
11 1 1 11 1 1
SY A g
SS Y A g k
rr r r
β
β ≡+ = + ++ −− −
++ + +
  (3-3) 
 
2.2 Pareto-Efficient Solution 
  First of all, we investigate the Pareto-efficient first-best allocation in this 
model as a benchmark. A unitary benevolent government, consolidating the CG and 
the LG, could attain the first best by optimally allocating the total tax revenue 
among nationwide public goods and local public goods in each period. That is, the 
unitary government, which implements an optimal allocation of {, , } tt Ggk, 








β +=+ ++ + +
++ + +
     (4)   7
This equation is obtained by eliminating  1 A  and  2 A   from (2-1)(2-2) and (3-1)(3-2), 
respectively. 
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Further, μ is the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (4). From these conditions, we 
have 
  22 Gg uv =         ( 5 - 1 )






g + =         (5-2) 
  r k f + = ′ 1 ) (         (5-3) 
 S 1 = S2 =  0        (5-4) 
The above optimality conditions (5-1), (5-2), (5-3), and (5-4) and the overall 
feasibility condition (4) determine the Pareto-efficient allocation as the benchmark 
case. Condition (5-1) means that the marginal benefit of pubic goods is equalized 
between the CG and the LG. Condition (5-2) governs the standard (intertemporal) 
optimal allocation of local public spending between the two periods. Condition (5-3) 
is the standard first-best criterion of public investment. Finally, condition (5-4) is 
obviously the efficiency condition. We do not have any rent-seeking activities with 
the first-best solution. 
 
 
3. Hard-Budget Game 
We now investigate the outcomes in a decentralized multi-government 
non-cooperative system, where the benevolent central and rent-seeking local 
governments decide their policy variables non-cooperatively. First of all, we 
consider the hard-budget game in this section. Here, we investigate the fully (or 
isolated) decentralized Nash equilibrium at the exogenously given  β  > 0. In this 
game the CG is the leader, and the LG is the follower. In the hard-budget game the 
CG may set  2 0 A =   throughout the game.   8
At the first stage, the CG determines the grants in period 1,  1 A  (and  hence 
its debt issuance B and public goods,  2 G ). Then, at the second stage, the LG 
determines its expenditures,  12 ,, ggk , and rent-seeking activities S1 and S2. At the 
start of period 2, the CG maintains the committed value of  2 0 A = 4. 
The CG maximizes (1) subject to (2) by choosing the size of transfer to LG in 
period 1,  1 A . On the other hand, the LG, which represents the interests of 
rent-seeking local politicians, maximizes the present value of wasteful public 
spending or rent, S = S1 + S2/(1 + r) by choosing local public goods and investment 
subject to the following survival constraint: 
12 () () vg vg U δ +=        ( 6 )  
where  U   means the reservation utility, which depends on the preferences of voters. 
If condition (6) is not satisfied, voters do not re-elect the current government, and 
the ruling local politicians cannot stay in office. In this sense, we implicitly assume 
that there are many politicians available in each region. It is plausible to assume 
that 
12 () ()
FF F U U vg vg δ <≡ +  
where  12 ,
FF gg   are the first-best levels of  12 , gg , respectively. 
Suppose there are many types of politicians. The type of politician may be 
expressed in terms of the degree of rent seeking. If the reservation utility, U , is 
lower, the associated politician is a greater rent seeker. Voters may choose the 
desired type of politician by undertaking political efforts. If they spend more on 
political efforts, they may find or select a less rent-seeking politician. For simplicity, 
we assume that the optimizing behavior of voters is given in the present model, so 
that both their political efforts and the resulting reservation utility are fixed. Note 
that nationwide public goods are not controlled by local politicians, so their survival 
does not depend on them5. 
 
3.1 Second Stage 
Let us investigate the outcome of this hard-budget game. The LG’s problem 
at the second stage is to maximize 
 S=
22





β +− + + +
++
  subject to (6). 
Then, the first-order conditions with respect to  12 ,, gg and k   are as follows: 
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δ =+         (5-2) 
From these conditions, (6), (7), and (5-2), the optimal levels of 
2
***
1,, ggk , and S are 








, is minimized under the survival condition (6). Both conditions (6) and 
(5-2) determine the equilibrium values of  12 , gg  in  this  game, 
**
12 , gg . Condition (7) 
determines k in this game, k*. Note that the optimal levels of 
2
***
1,, ggk are not 
dependent on the CG’s choice variable,  1 A . Note also that S increases with  1 A . S1 
and S2 are uniquely determined at a given level of D to meet the budget constraints 
(3-1) and (3-2) 6. 
 
3.2 First Stage 
The CG maximizes (1) subject to (2-1) and (2-2) by choosing a transfer to 
the LG,  1 A , considering the optimizing behavior of the LG, described in section 3.1. 
That is, the CG anticipates that the LG determines its choice variables under 
constraint (6) at the second stage. Hence, the resulting social welfare reduces to 
2 () Wu GU δ =+ . The equilibrium social welfare increases with  2 G , and hence 
decreases with  1 A   at a given level of k. 
Thus, it is always desirable for the CG to reduce  1 A  (and hence S) by 
raising  2 G  as much as possible. That is, a decrease in  1 A  raises social welfare by 
reducing S1 and S2. Considering the non-negativity constraint,  1 0 A ≥ , the optimal 
level of  1 A  for the CG is given by  1 A  = 0. The social welfare, which increases with 
2 G , is maximized at  1 A  = 0 at the given level of local public expenditures, 
1212 ,,, ggSS , associated with k*. Although  S  is minimized at  1 A  = 0, we still have 
positive values of  12 , SS. 
 
3.3 Outcome 
















δ =+         (5-2) 
  12 0 AA ==         ( 8 )  
Condition (5-2) implies that the relative (intertemporal) allocation between g1 and g2 
is efficient in this game. However, these public goods and local investments are not 
necessarily provided optimally. In other words, condition (5-1) does not necessarily 








, is arbitrarily set, 
depending on the exogenous parameter  β , the rent-seeking behavior of the LG, 
and the survival condition (6). 
Condition (5-3) does not hold, either. Considering  β  < 1, (7) means that k 
is under-provided due to the vertical externality of the overlapping tax base, 
*
F kk < , where  * k  is the level of k in this game and 
F k  is the level of k at the 
first best. Since the local government does not take into account the positive 
spillover effect of the increasing overlapping tax base of the central government, 
local public investment is not sufficient. Further, the total tax revenue shared by 
both governments in period 2 is too little. 
To sum up, there are three sources of inefficiency in the decentralized 
system. First, since β is not necessarily set at the optimal level, the allocation of 
public spending between the CG and LG is not determined optimally. Second, there 
is the vertical externality of public investment due to the overlapping tax base, and 
hence k is too little (
* F kk < ). Finally, because of the rent-seeking activities of the 
LG (
F UU < ), local public goods,  12 , gg, are too little, and wasteful public 
expenditures S1 and S2 become positive. 
 
 
4 Soft-Budget Game 
4.1 CG’s Ex Post Transfer: Second Stage 
  As explained before, at the first stage of the hard-budget game, the CG 
determines  1 A  anticipating that the LG will choose  12 12 ,, ,, ggk SS to meet the 
survival condition (6) at the second stage, and maintains the committed value of 
2 0 A = . Then, it is optimal to set  1 A  = 0 since a reducing  1 A  depresses rent 
seeking to some extent. 
However, when the hard-budget game is over, the LG’s optimizing behavior 
also becomes fixed, so that the survival condition is not binding ex post. The CG 
may now have an incentive to change the committed value of  2 0 A = . That is, the 
CG may raise  2 A  by creating grants to the LG ex post in order to increase social   11
welfare. Thus, the LG would face the soft-budget constraint. This is a time 
inconsistency problem. In this soft-budget game the LG becomes the leader, and the 
CG the follower. 
We first investigate the optimizing behavior of the CG at the beginning of 
the second period. After the LG determines local expenditures, g1,  2 g 
, S1, S2, and k, 
at the first stage of this soft-budget game, the CG may choose its public spending, G2 
(and effectively g2), subject to the budget conditions (2-2) and (3-2) by creating an 
additional grant,  2 A , appropriately, in period 2. Here,  2 g 
  is the level of 
second-period local public spending chosen by the LG at the first stage of the 
soft-budget game, and  2 g  is the final outcome of second-period local public 
spending effectively chosen by the CG. Note that  222 ggA = + 
. At a given level of 
2 g 
, an increase in  2 A  means an increase in  2 g  by the same amount because  k  
and  2 S   are chosen at the first stage of this game. 
Eliminating  2 A  from (2-2) and (3-2) gives the overall budget constraint in 
period 2 as 
  222 2 (1 ) GgS r D Y +++ + =      (9) 
Note that  2 S  and  2 Y  are determined by the LG at the first stage. By 
choosing  2 A   in period 2, the CG may in fact choose the allocation of G2 and g2 under 
the overall budget constraint (9) to maximize social welfare in period 2, 
22 () () uG vg + . Since the rent-seeking activity was already performed at the first 
stage of this game, the survival condition (6) is no longer binding at this stage. 
When the rent-seeking activity is over, an additional grant to the LG may increase 
2 g . This is why we have the soft-budget outcome without information asymmetry or 
cost sharing in this paper. 
Thus, the first-order condition at the second stage of this game is given by 
  22 Gg uv =         (5-1) 
From the optimality condition (5-1) and the second-period budget constraints (2-2) 
and (3-2), at given levels of local expenditures, S2 and k, which are chosen by the LG 
at the first stage, we may derive the optimal responses  2 A  and  g2 (and hence G2) of 
the CG as functions of S2 and k, respectively. Although  2 A  and  2 g  change in the 
same direction by the same amount at a given level of  2 g 
, they may change in a 
different way when  2 S  and k  (and  hence  2 g 
) change: 
  22 (, ) AA S k =         ( 1 0 - 1 )  
  22 (, ) gg S k =         ( 1 0 - 2 )    12
By totally differentiating the budget conditions (2-2) and (9) and the 
optimality condition (5-1), we have 
  22 (1 ) ( ) dG f k dk dA β ′ =− −  
222() dG dg dS f k dk ′ ++=  
  22 (1 )dG dg η η −=  
where  η   22 2 /[ ] gg GG gg vu v ≡+  represents the relative evaluation of G2 compared 
with g2. It is assumed for simplicity that  01 η < <  is constant. Then, we have the 
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22 ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) () () k
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A fk fk fk
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ββ η
∂∂ ′ ′′ == −+ − = − −
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(1 ) η −− <0       (11-3) 





∂ ′ == −
∂
       (11-4) 
Equation (11-1) shows the plausible outcome of the soft-budget constraint 
due to rent-seeking activities. That is, an increase in  2 S  (or a decrease in  2 g 
) at 
the given levels of  k and  2 A  results in a decrease in  2 g , leading to more grants, 
2 A , from the central government. Hence, we have  0 S A > . We may conclude as 
follows. When the LG conducts more rent-seeking activities,  2 S , at the first stage of 
this soft-budget game,  2 g 
 (and hence g2) falls relative to (3-2). This outcome is not 
good for the CG since it would like to realize the optimality condition (5-2) to 
increase social welfare ex post. Thus, the CG has an incentive to provide additional 
subsidies to the LG in period 2 in order to raise the ex post level of g2 and reduce the 
ex post level of  2 G . This positive effect of  2 S  on  2 A  is an important outcome of 
the soft-budget game. 
Moreover, we have another outcome of the soft-budget result due to the 
effect of public investment on  2 A ,  k A , which is another new channel caused by the 
vertical externality. As shown in (11-2), the sign of  k A   is generally ambiguous. If 1 
– β > η, then  0 k A >  (and vice versa). That is, if the marginal valuation of G2 is 
relatively small and 1 – β is too high, then g2 would be too low compared with G2. In 
such a case, when k increases, the CG would react by increasing  2 A   in order to 
maximize the ex post social welfare. We may conclude as follows. An increase in k   13
raises the CG’s tax revenue by  (1 ) ' f β − , resulting in an increase in the utility from 
2 G  by  2 (1 ) ' G f u β −  at a given level of  2 A . This increase in  2 G  is optimal if the 
utility from 2 g  increases by  2 (1 )(1 ) ' / g fv β ηη − − . On the other hand, it actually 
raises the marginal utility of  2 g  by  2 ' g f v β  at a given level of  2 A . Hence, if 
1 β η −>, it is desirable that  2 g   is increased by a reduction of  2 G , so the CG would 
react by giving more grants  2 A   to the LG to stimulate  2 g . 
  A key part of the model is the interaction between the CG and LG. The CG 
intends to allocate revenues to equalize the marginal gains of public goods between 
the central and local governments so long as the rent-seeking activity is fixed. The 
CG’s benevolent incentives result in a soft-budget constraint by creating additional 
grants in period 2 when the LG conducts more rent seeking and undertakes more 
investment. The soft-budget outcome is caused by two channels: rent seeking and 
public investment. First, more rent seeking means a decline in local public goods in 
period 2 and hence upsets the central government’s optimal allocation strategy. 
Second, more investment means an increase in the tax revenue of the CG and hence 
may raise the amount of central public goods too much. Then, the CG has an 
incentive to make additional grants in period 2 by stimulating  2 g   in order to raise 
the ex post social welfare. 
 
4.2 LG’s Behavior: First Stage 
We now investigate the optimizing behavior of the LG at the first stage of 
the soft-budget game and the resulting subgame perfect outcome. The local 
government’s survival constraint (6) is effectively binding here with the LG 
anticipating that the CG would change  2 A  in response to local expenditures, as 
summarized by equation (10-1) and (10-2). Therefore, the survival condition and the 
objective function for the LG are rewritten as 




[( ) ] ( , ) ( , )
11 1






=+ + − − −
++ +
   (13) 
The LG maximizes the objective S, (13), subject to the survival condition (12) at 
given levels of the tax share parameter β and the reservation utility  U . 
The first-order conditions with respect to its choice variables, g1, S2, and k, 
are respectively given as follows: 
1 10 g v ω −+ =         ( 1 4 - 1 )  
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where ω (>0) is the Lagrange multiplier of the survival constraint (12). Equations 
(14-1) and (14-2) govern the allocation of g1 and  2 g at a given level of the tax share 
parameters  β  and U . 
Substituting (11-1), (11-2), and (11-3) into (14-1) and (14-2), we have 
  12 (1 )(1 ) gg vv r δ η =− +        (15-1) 
Thus, the (first-best) optimality condition between  1 g  and  2 g   given by (5-2) is not 
realized here. 






g + =         (5-2) 
This is an important difference between the hard-budget and soft-budget outcomes. 
If the CG did not provide additional grants  2 A , as in the hard-budget case ( 2 A  =  0), 
the optimizing behavior of the LG could have attained this optimality condition 
(5-2) with respect to the relative allocation of  1 g  and  2 g . 
On the contrary, the response functions of the CG, (10-1) and (10-2), would 
effectively reduce the marginal cost of raising g1, stimulating g1 in period 1. Hence, 
the LG would reduce  2 g 
 (and hence  2 g ) but increase  1 g  to satisfy the survival 
condition (6). By doing so, the LG may increase the present value of rent seeking, S, 
by receiving more grants from the CG. Equation (15-1) means that  1 g  is too high 
compared with  2 g and G2. The soft-budget constraint leads to an increase in  2 A , 
which has a positive effect on  1 g  as well as  2 S . It should be noted that the 
soft-budget game actually reduces the equilibrium levels of  2 g  and  2 G  compared 
with the hard-budget game. Anticipating more  2 A , the LG has an incentive to 
reduce  2 g 
, which results in a decrease in  2 g  although the CG raises  2 A . This is 
because the LG may reduce  2 g  by increasing  1 g  in order to meet the survival 
condition (6). 
In the hard-budget case we have shown that (5-2) is attained but (5-4) is not. 
On the contrary, in the soft-budget case, substituting (11-2), (11-3), and (11-4) into 
(14-3), we have 
  12 (1 ) ' g g vf v δ η =−        (15-2) 
Considering (15-1) and (15-2), we finally get 
  1' rf +=         (5-4) 
The first-best level of k is attained here. We may conclude as follows. When k rises,   15
the LG may expect additional grants,  2 A , from the CG due to an increase in 
2 (1 )Y β − , in addition to an increase in its own tax revenue,  2 Y β , so that the 
effective marginal benefit of an increase in k becomes  ' f , instead of  ' f β . As 
shown in (11-2), the direct effect of an increase in k on  2 A  is (1 ) ' ' f f β η −− . In 
addition, as shown in (11-4), an increase in k would raise  2 g , and indirectly benefit 
the LG by alleviating the survival constraint. This indirect benefit may be 
expressed as 
   2 (1 ) ' (1 ) ' gk k vg r g f r f δωη + −= + + −. 
Thus, the overall beneficial effect through the CG’s response in the soft-budget 
game is (1 ) ' f β −  at  1' rf += , and hence it may internalize the vertical 
externality. It follows that, at the subgame perfect solution, k is given by the 
first-best level, 
F k , which is larger than 
* k   in the hard-budget case of  1 A =  2 A  = 
0. This is an interesting result of the soft-budget constraint. The CG does not intend 
to internalize the vertical externality by raising  2 A  to the LG. Nevertheless, the 
CG’s additional grants in response to k may effectively internalize the vertical 
externality. 
 
4.3 Welfare Comparison 
  We have shown that the soft-budget constraint stimulates public 
investment and the first-best level of k is attained. However, at the same time,  2 A  
becomes positive, which hurts social welfare. We now investigate the overall welfare 
effect of the soft-budget constraint. At the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
soft-budget game, we have 
  2 () Wu GU δ =+ . 
The ex post welfare increases with  2. G  Note that even in the soft-budget case the 
subgame perfect equilibrium actually satisfies the survival condition because the 
LG behaves under condition (12) at the first stage. 
An increase in k may raise  2 A  both directly and indirectly as shown in 
(11-1) and (11-2). On the other hand, when k rises, it can increase the tax revenue of 
the CG. The overall impact of an increase in k on  2 G  (or CG’s net tax revenue, 
excluding  2 A ) is expressed by a marginal change in the right-hand side of (2). This 
term may be written as 
 




β ≡− − +       ( 1 6 )  
The sign of this term seems ambiguous. However, we can show that this is actually 
negative.   16
Since (5-1) holds in the soft-budget game, an increase in  2 G  corresponds  to 
an increase in  2 g . On the other hand, (15-1) means that  2 g  actually declines due 
to rent-seeking activities. It follows that the equilibrium level of  2 G   is also lower in 
the soft-budget game than in the hard-budget game. Hence, the resulting social 
welfare is lower in the soft-budget game as well. This undesirable outcome occurs 
because the soft budget stimulates rent seeking. A rise in k does not lead to an 
increase in either the overall tax revenues available to the CG or to the provision of 
2 G . Thus, because of the survival condition, an increase in k will not improve social 
welfare, but the amount of rent will rise. 
Under the vertical externality due to overlapping tax bases, local public 
investment is too little in the hard-budget game. From this viewpoint the soft 
budget may improve welfare by stimulating inefficient local investment. Actually, 
we have shown that the first-best level of public investment is attained. Thus, it 
naturally follows that the soft budget could be welfare improving since public 
investment is too little in the hard-budget game. 
However, once we incorporate rent-seeking activities, the soft-budget game 
is actually welfare deteriorating by depressing useful public goods provided by both 
the central and local governments. Since the utility from local public goods is fixed 
by the survival constraint of local politicians, an increase in public investment 
would not directly improve social welfare but would increase rent. Hence, the 
deteriorating effect becomes more powerful than the beneficial effect. We have 
shown that the welfare implications of the soft budget are dependent on not only the 




5.1 Benevolent LG 
  Suppose that the LG is also benevolent. Suppose also that the LG may 
choose its debt issuance D as well. Otherwise, the LG’s choice of  12 , gg  becomes 
meaningless when  12 0 SS ==   and the tax rate is exogenously given. The following 










      ( 1 7 )  
Then, the LG maximizes the social welfare (1) subject to the budget constraint (17) 
by choosing local public goods, local debt issuance, and investment, while assuming 
that nationwide public goods and grants from the CG are fixed. The first-order 




















δ =+         (5-2) 
Since the LG does not internalize the spillover effect of public investment on the 
CG’s tax revenue, k is still too little. This result is the same as in section 3.1. 
The welfare implications of a rent-seeking LG are different from those of a 
benevolent LG. The latter does not conduct any rent-seeking activity, and the 
equilibrium levels of  12 , gg  are higher than in the rent-seeking case. The utility 
from local public goods,  12 () () vg vg δ + , is also higher than the reservation utility in 
the rent-seeking case,  U . Also, note that an increase in  1 A  has a positive income 
effect on  12 , gg ; that is,  12 , gg are increasing functions of  1 A : 
  11 1 () gg A =         ( 1 8 - 1 )  
  22 1 () gg A =           ( 1 8 - 2 )  
  At the first stage of the hard-budget game, the CG maximizes social welfare 
by choosing  1 A  (and  hence  G2). In contrast to the rent-seeking case, the utility from 
local public goods,  12 () () vg vg δ + , may be affected here by the CG’s choice of  1 A . In 
other words, the CG now maximizes 
  21 1 1 2 1 ((1 ) (1 ) ) ( ( )) ( ( )) Wu Y r A v g A v g A δ βδ =− − ++ +  
by choosing  1 A . It is easy to show that the first-order condition reduces to 
  22 Gg uv =         (5-1) 
The optimal level of  1 A  is determined to satisfy (5-1), which is generally positive if 
β  is  low. 
  Since the optimality condition (5-1) is attained as the outcome of the 
hard-budget game, this is time consistent. It is optimal for the CG to commit itself 
to the level of  2 0 A =   after the hard-budget game is over. The CG does not have an 
incentive to raise  2 A  ex post. The soft-budget game is not relevant. The first-best 
level of public investment cannot be attained in the case of a benevolent LG since 
the CG does not have an incentive to make an additional grant to the LG. 
 
5.2 Spillover Effect of Local Public Investment 
  The vertical externality is a key factor to obtain the result that local public 
investment is too low in the hard-budget constraint. If we incorporate the spillover 
effect of local public investment in a framework of multi-local governments, we 
could get a similar result regarding the level of public investment. That is, local   18
public investment becomes too low in a system of multi-local governments where 
each local government determines its public investment non-cooperatively. 
Generally, the main result in section 4 would not hold in such a case. 
However, we might obtain a similar result if the CG internalizes the 
spillover effect. For example, suppose the CG now intends to redistribute resources 
among LGs. The spillover effect could be internalized by the CG’s redistribution 
policy. Then, we could obtain a similar analytical result even if we incorporate the 
spillover effect of local public investment in a system of multi-local governments. 
 
5.3 Inclusion of Private Consumption 
  Suppose we explicitly incorporate private consumption into the model. Now, 
12 , cc  represent private consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively,  t is the tax 
rate, and  i y  is the income. We may define tax revenue as  ii ty Y = . (i = 1, 2). For 
simplicity, we assume that  1 c  is exogenously fixed, similar to  1 G . We do not 
consider private savings, either. The budget constraint of the household in period 2 
is given as 
  22 (1 ) ct y =−         ( 1 9 )  
  In the hard-budget game, the second-stage outcome is the same as in 
section 3 since the rent-seeking LG behaves in the same way. Suppose now that the 
CG may choose the tax rate t optimally. At the first stage, the CG intends to 
maximize 
  22 () ( ) Uc uG δ δ +  
by choosing t and  1 A   subject to (19),  2 0 A = , and 
  22 1 (1 ) (1 ) Gt y A r β =− + +       ( 2 ) ’  
The optimality conditions are 
  22 (1 ) cG Uu β =−         ( 2 0 )  
and  1 A  = 0. The tax rate t is set so as to equate  (1 ) β −  times the marginal utility 
of public goods { 2 (1 ) G u β − } and the marginal cost of public goods { 2 c U }. With the 
soft-budget outcome, the analytical result is qualitatively the same as in section 4. 
The CG has an incentive to raise  2 A  to attain (5-1). However, it does not have an 
incentive to change the tax rate because (20) is also the ex post optimality condition 
in the soft-budget game. 
  The welfare implications will change to some extent. Since Y2 is an 
increasing function of k,  2 y  also increases with k at a given tax rate. Thus, the 
utility from private consumption increases with k as well. In section 4 we have 
shown that since  2 G  decreases because of the soft-budget constraint, its overall   19
welfare effect is negative in the model without private consumption. On the 
contrary, here, if an increase in k raises private consumption, this increase is 
welfare improving. This is an additional positive effect. Hence, the welfare 
implication becomes ambiguous. That is to say, the soft-budget game is welfare 
deteriorating so long as the welfare-improving effect due to an increase in private 
consumption is not strong enough. In other words, the main analytical result would 
almost hold when private consumption is explicitly incorporated. 
  So far, we have assumed that the survival utility,  U , is fixed. When k rises, 
it increases the disposal income of voters. This might well stimulate their political 
effort to select a less rent-seeking politician. Then,  U  may increase with k, which 
is beneficial for the voters. If we allow for this possibility, the soft-budget outcome 
will not necessarily be deteriorating as in section 4. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have theoretically investigated the hard-budget and 
soft-budget outcomes with grants from the central government to the local 
government by clarifying the vertical externality of local expenditures due to the 
overlapping tax bases between the two governments, using a simple two-period 
model. We have explicitly incorporated rent-seeking activities by local politicians or 
local governments to explore both the benefits and costs of the soft-budget 
constraint. 
We called the committed version of  2 A  = 0 the hard-budget game and the 
uncommitted version of  2 A  > 0 the soft-budget game, respectively. When the 
central government, as the leader of the intergovernmental game, commits itself to 
a predetermined value of  2 A   = 0, the local government is subject to the 
hard-budget constraint. In this game the CG chooses  1 A   = 0, although the outcome 
is not the first best, because of several factors such as the predetermined value of β, 
the rent-seeking activity of the LG, and the overlapping taxes. Public investment is 
too low because of the vertical externality. In the hard-budget game, the CG may 
depress the LG’s rent-seeking behavior to some extent by setting  1 A   = 0. This is the 
merit of the hard-budget game, although the game is not time consistent. 
In the standard-type model, the soft-budget constraint comes from 
information asymmetry or cost sharing. On the contrary, we have considered a very 
simple two-period model without uncertainty or information asymmetry. It has 
been shown that rent seeking is crucial to the soft-budget problem considered here. 
The CG could raise the ex post social welfare by increasing  2 A  after the LG’s 
rent-seeking behavior is already over.   20
In the soft-budget game, the local government has an incentive to raise 
local public investment and rent-seeking activities. First, more rent seeking results 
in a decline in local public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the central 
government’s optimal allocation strategy. Second, more public investment means a 
higher revenue for the CG, which may therefore subsidize the local government 
more. These are new lines of thought explored in this paper. 
The central government intends to provide more local public goods by 
raising grants ex post. We have shown that the soft budget works to internalize the 
vertical externality, so the first-best level of public investment is attained. However, 
the equilibrium level of local public goods in period 2 is actually lower than it is in 
the hard-budget game, harming social welfare. So long as the reservation utility is 
fixed by the survival constraint of local politicians, the local politician may obtain 
more rent by raising  1 g  and reducing  2 g . An increase in public investment will 
not improve social welfare directly, but it will increase rent. Hence, the 
deteriorating effect becomes more powerful than the beneficial effect. 
With the vertical externality due to overlapping tax bases, local public 
investment is too little in the hard-budget game. One could argue that the soft 
budget may be welfare improving because the first-best level of public investment is 
attained. Nevertheless, the soft-budget game has been shown to be actually welfare 
deteriorating by depressing useful public goods provided by both the central and 
local governments. 
We make no claim that the soft-budget outcome is always deteriorating. If 
the survival utility increases with a larger k, social welfare could be higher in the 
soft-budget game despite more rent seeking. We have shown that the welfare 
implications of the soft budget are dependent on the degree of rent seeking. Our 
model is admittedly highly stylized and abstracts from several possible directions of 
generalization such as asymmetric information between the two governments. 
Nevertheless, this paper has explored the possibility that the normative 
implications of the soft budget are dependent not only on whether public investment 
is too little or too much but also on the degree of rent seeking.   21
Appendix 1: Multiple Local Governments 
Suppose there are n (≥2) local governments. If we define the total amount 
of local public goods as  12 , gg   and each local government’s supply of public goods as 
12 ,















=∑        ( A 1 )  
We may define other variables of local governments as in (A1). Then the budget 
constraints of the CG and the LG are the same as in the text. For simplicity, 
suppose all local governments are identical. The social welfare (1) can now be 
rewritten as 
 
i W = 12 2 () { () () }
ii vg uG vg δ ++       ( A 2 )  
where Wi is the social welfare in the representative agent in region i. Then, the 









  It follows that as in section 2.2 the first-best conditions are given by (5-2), 
(5-3), (5-4), and 
  22 Gg nu v =         ( A 3 )  
Equation (A3) corresponds to the well-known Samuelson condition of the pure 
public good, G. Analytically, we have the same results as in sections 3 and 4. 
For example, suppose in the soft-budget game the CG chooses  2
i A  at a 
given level of  2
j A (ij ≠ ), then the ex post optimality condition would be 
  22
i
Gg uv =  
which is the same as in the text but differs from the first-best condition (A3). Then, 
regarding the game between the CG and the LG, we may assume that each LG 
behaves non-cooperatively and regards other LGs’ choice variables as given. 
Equation (7) may be rewritten as 
∑ ∑ ∑
≠ ≠ ≠






j i Y Y D r S S g g G 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ) 1 (      (A4) 
Further, the central government’s response functions in place of (10-1) and (10-2) 
are given as 
  22 (,)
ii i i AA S k =         ( A 5 - 1 )  
  22 (,)
ii i i gg S k =         ( A 5 - 2 )  
Similarly, we have 
  22 (1 ) ( )
ii i dG f k dk dA β ′ =− −  
222'( )
ii i i dG dg dS f k dk ++=  
  22 (1 )
i dG dg ηη −=  
Hence, we have (11-1), (11-2), (11-3), and (11-4) as in the text. 
Intuitively, this is because an increase in 
i k  has a spillover effect on the 
CG only. Since each LG’s behavior does not have any spillover effects on other LGs,   22
the number of LGs would not make much of a difference as far as the game between 
each LG and the CG is concerned. Thus, the analytical result would qualitatively be 
the same as in the main text. That is, the first-best level of k is attained in the 
soft-budget game, but the resulting social welfare is lower due to rent-seeking 
activities.   23
Notes 
1.  It is now well recognized in the tax competition literature that such vertical 
externalities are likely to leave local taxes too high. This is because each local 
government unduly discounts the pressure on the central government’s 
spending it creates by raising its own tax rate. See Keen and Kotsogiannis 
(2002), Keen (1998), and Wilson (1999) among others. 
2.  It is shown that rent seeking is crucial to the soft-budget problem considered 
here because the setting of benevolent local governments does not create time 
inconsistency. 
3.  As shown in Appendix 1, the analytical results would be qualitatively almost 
the same even if we consider non-cooperative behavior by multi-local 
governments. 
4.  Here, we assume the restricted scheme of local debt issuance, and the LG may 
not choose the optimal amount of D. Note that this assumption would not 
restrict the opportunity set of the LG since it may transfer resources 
effectively by choosing S1 and S2 appropriately. 
5.  A more general specification would assume that the probability the officials 
can remain employed is a function of the utility of local residents compared 
with the utility available elsewhere. See Wilson and Gordon (2003). 
6.  If we assume that D is optimally chosen by the LG but either  1 S  or  2 S  is 
exogenously given, we still obtain the same conditions, (6), (7), and (5-2). 
7.  These analytical results are relevant to Japan. In Japan, local expenditures 
and grants from the CG to the LG actually increased in the 1990s. The 
Japanese central government mainly increased borrowing at the Special 
Account of Allocation and Transfer Taxes ex post facto, in response to 
excessive local expenditures by local governments. Doi and Ihori (2009) point 
out that the soft-budget constraint produced wasteful public spending in the 
form of local public works.   24
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